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The Meaning of “Direct” Effect on 
Domestic Commerce Under the Foreign 
Trade Antitrust Improvements Act 
John J. Miles∗ 
Claire Leonard’s Note discusses a question that has received 
relatively little attention in the case law or commentary involving 
the ability of the Sherman Antitrust Act1 to reach unlawful 
conduct occurring in a foreign country but affecting commerce 
and competition in the United States: What standard should 
courts apply in determining whether that conduct has a “direct” 
effect on U.S. commerce, and if the domestic effect is also 
substantial and foreseeable, whether the conduct is subject to the 
Sherman Act under the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements 
Act (FTAIA) of 1982.2 When, for example, is the effect of a 
price-fixing conspiracy occurring abroad but affecting the price of 
the product in the United States sufficiently direct and thus 
potentially subject to the Sherman Act to permit recovery of 
damages by American consumers? As Ms. Leonard’s Note and 
this Comment explain, the circuits are split on this question, and, 
as trade between the United States and other countries 
worldwide continues to expand, the question needs a uniform 
answer.  
The extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law to 
conduct occurring abroad can raise sensitive international 
political issues. Over 130 countries now have their own 
competition laws, so one could argue that relief should be sought 
under those laws.3 While most are similar to U.S. antitrust law, 
                                                                                                     
 ∗ Of Counsel, Ober|Kaler, Washington, D.C.; Adjunct Professor of Law, 
Washington and Lee University School of Law.   
 1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2012) (prohibiting agreements unreasonably 
restraining competition, monopolization, attempted monopolization, and 
conspiracies to monopolize affecting commerce among the states or with foreign 
nations). 
 2. Id. § 6a. 
 3. Claire L. Leonard, In Need of Direction: An Evaluation of the “Direct 
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however, the competition policies of countries differ, as do the 
details of their laws, their interpretation, the aggressiveness of 
enforcement, and remedies. Nevertheless, care is warranted 
when the United States attempts to apply its competition rules to 
foreign parties or conduct occurring in foreign countries. On the 
other hand, the United States would seem to have a legitimate 
interest in protecting its consumers and markets from 
anticompetitive effects resulting domestically, regardless of 
where they originated or by whom they were implemented.  
Ms. Leonard’s Note admirably outlines the history and case 
development regarding the application of the Sherman Act to 
violations that occur in foreign lands but affect U.S. commerce.4 
As she explains, barely some nineteen years after passage of the 
Sherman Act in 1890, the Supreme Court, in America Banana 
Co. v. United Fruit Co. (Alcoa),5 held that application of U.S. 
antitrust law to violations occurring elsewhere depended on the 
locus of the unlawful conduct—if overseas, U.S. antitrust laws 
were inapplicable, regardless of the effect on commerce or 
competition in the United States.6 That conclusion was effectively 
overruled in 1945, when the Second Circuit (the Supreme Court 
lacking a quorum), in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,7 
held that regardless of where the unlawful conduct occurred, the 
Sherman Act applied if the challenged actions “[1] were intended 
to affect imports and [2] did affect them.”8 The court emphasized 
that for the Sherman Act to apply, the parties and conduct had to 
satisfy both the intent and effects elements.9 As to the latter, it 
                                                                                                     
Effect” Requirement Under the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 73 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 489 (2016). 
 4. See id. at Part II (outlining the history of U.S. antitrust law’s 
extraterritorial reach). 
 5. 213 U.S. 347 (1909). 
 6. See id. at 355–56 (explaining that “the general and almost universal 
rule is the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly 
by the law of the country where the act is done”). 
 7. 148 F.2d 416 (1945). 
 8. Id. at 444; see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 
796 (1993) (citing Alcoa for the proposition that “the Sherman Act applies to 
foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact produce some 
substantial effect in the United States”). 
 9. The Second Circuit noted, for example, that many restraints on 
competition in foreign countries would have repercussions in the United States 
without the perpetrators intending that they do so, but that “Congress certainly 
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noted that it “should not impute to Congress an intent to punish 
all who its courts can reach, for conduct which has no 
consequences within the United States,” but that “it is settled 
law . . . that any state may impose liabilities even upon persons 
not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has 
consequences within its borders which the state reprehends.”10 
The Alcoa formulation for extraterritorial application was 
helpful as a general matter, focusing the analysis on effects on 
domestic commerce and competition, but it left many specific 
questions unanswered. How substantial must the effect be? How 
direct? Is the intent element meant to require merely that an 
effect in the United States be foreseeable or must there be a more 
specific intent? Must the effect in the United States be what gives 
rise to the plaintiff’s claim? These and other issues led to 
significant confusion in the lower courts about precisely what the 
test was.11 Although most applied the general intent and 
domestic-effect requirements of Alcoa, their interpretations 
sometimes added different glosses and thus no totally uniform 
standard emerged.12 
As a result, Congress sought to “clarify, perhaps to limit, but 
not to expand . . . the Sherman Act’s scope as applied to foreign 
commerce”13 and establish a uniform test by amending the 
Sherman Act through passage of the FTAIA in 1982.14 But if 
Congress’s intent was to “clarify” this question, few would opine 
that it succeeded. Far from a model of concise statutory drafting, 
                                                                                                     
did not intend the [Sherman] Act to cover them,” and it “assume[d] that the Act 
does not cover agreements, even though intended to affect imports or exports 
unless [their] performance is shown actually to have had some effect upon 
them.” Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443; see also Hartford Fire Ins., 509 U.S. at 797 n.24 
(explaining that “the general understanding [is] that the Sherman Act covers 
foreign conduct producing a substantial intended effect in the United States”). 
 10. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443.  
 11. Leonard, supra note 3, at 498–99. 
 12. Differences in the standards are described in Zenith Radio Corp. v. 
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161, 1177–89 (E.D. Pa. 1980), aff’d 
in part and rev’d in part sub nom. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 
723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev’d sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. 
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
 13. F. Hoffman–LaRoche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 169 (2004). 
 14. Note that the FTAIA applies only to claims under the Sherman Act, not 
to claims under the Clayton, Robinson-Patman, or Federal Trade Commission 
Acts. 
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FTAIA provides, for purposes here, that the Sherman Act does 
not apply to foreign commerce—period—unless (1) the commerce 
is import commerce, or (2)(a) the unlawful foreign conduct has a 
“direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect”15 on 
non-import domestic commerce, and (b) the domestic “effect gives 
rise to”16 the plaintiff’s Sherman Act claim. 
The FTAIA leaves unanswered many questions. Why should 
import commerce be subject to the Sherman Act, regardless of 
whether its domestic effect meets the FTAIA requirements? The 
Alcoa standard raises other questions. What role, if any, does 
comity with foreign countries, which FTAIA does not mention, 
play in the analysis?17 Under what circumstances does the 
domestic effect of the violation give rise to the claim? And what 
standards apply in determining whether the effect on domestic 
commerce from the conduct is “direct,” “substantial,” and 
“reasonably foreseeable”? 
Ms. Leonard’s Note takes on one part of the last question—
how “direct” the relationship between the unlawful conduct and 
its domestic effect must be for the conduct to fall within the 
Sherman Act. In particular, her Note considers whether the 
domestic effect must follow as an immediate consequence of the 
defendant’s conduct, or, resulting in broader coverage, whether 
there need only be a reasonably proximate causal connection 
between the foreign conduct and its domestic effect. To some 
                                                                                                     
 15. 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1) (2012). 
 16. Id. § 6a(2). 
 17. International comity, an important consideration in setting limits on 
the extraterritorial scope of U.S. laws, basically means “getting along” with 
foreign jurisdictions by respecting the policies, laws, and decisions of foreign 
countries in U.S. laws and courts. Leonard, supra note 3, at 503–04, 531–32. 
The Supreme Court, in F. Hoffman–LaRoche v. Empagran S.A., recognized this, 
explaining that it realized that application of American antitrust laws could 
“interfere with a foreign nation’s ability to independently regulate its own 
commercial affairs.” F. Hoffman–LaRoche, 542 U.S. at 165. But trumping that, 
the Court explained that American courts have long held that “application of 
our antitrust laws to foreign anticompetitive conduct is nonetheless reasonable, 
and hence consistent with principles of prescriptive comity, insofar as 
they . . . redress domestic antitrust injury that foreign anticompetitive conduct 
has caused.” Id. Or as the Seventh Circuit en banc has noted, “Foreigners who 
want to earn money from the sale of goods or services in American markets 
should expect to have to comply with U.S. law.” Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, 
Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 854 (7th Cir. 2012).  
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extent, this question strikes me as one of how many angels can 
dance on the head of a pin, and we might wonder how much 
practical effect the difference will have in future decisions. But as 
countries in the global economy become more economically 
integrated, foreign transactions increase, and the Antitrust 
Division prosecutions of global cartels affecting U.S. commerce 
increase, a consistent, universally applied standard would seem 
warranted. The Supreme Court has not spoken to the issue, and 
the question needs an answer. 
The disagreement stems primarily from conflicting decisions 
of the Ninth and Seventh Circuits. As Ms. Leonard’s Note 
explains, in United States v. LSL Biotechnologies,18 which one 
judge described as “a case of first impression,”19 a majority of the 
panel, relying primarily on the definition of direct in a Supreme 
Court decision20 involving a different statute, the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), held that for the effect on 
domestic commerce to be direct under the FTAIA, it must “follow 
as an immediate consequence of the defendant’s” unlawful 
conduct.21 Some eight years later, the Seventh Circuit, in Minn-
Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc.,22 explicitly rejected that meaning of 
the word and the Ninth Circuit’s analysis, holding instead that 
the effect is direct for purposes of the FTAIA if there was ‘“a 
reasonably proximate causal nexus’” between the unlawful 
conduct and its domestic effect.23 
Which standard is more appropriate? Ms. Leonard opts for 
the “reasonably proximate causal nexus” standard and explains 
her reasoning. I am not sure. Indeed, based on the analyses of the 
two courts, I question whether there is a “right” answer with 
                                                                                                     
 18. 379 F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 19. Id. at 683 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). 
 20. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607 (1992). 
 21. LSL, 379 F.3d at 680. 
 22. 683 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 23. Id. at 857 (quoting Maken Delrahim, Drawing the Boundaries of the 
Sherman Act: Recent Developments in the Application of the Antitrust Laws to 
Foreign Conduct, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. OF AM. L. 415, 430 (2005)). The 
Minn-Chem court pointed out that this is the standard applied by the Antitrust 
Division. See id. at 856–57 (“The other school of thought has been articulated by 
the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division . . . .”). 
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underlying significant support. But forced to make a choice, I 
would agree with Ms. Leonard’s conclusion. 
Neither decision offers strongly convincing rationales for its 
conclusion. The antitrust context in which the issue arose in LSL 
was somewhat strange to begin with. The case was a civil 
enforcement action by the Antitrust Division challenging a 
horizontal market-allocation agreement between an American 
firm, LSL, and an Israeli firm, Hazera, regarding particular 
tomato seeds they were to develop together or on their own and 
then market.24 They agreed that LSL would have the exclusive 
right to market the seeds in North America and thus that Hazera 
would not compete there—a horizontal market-allocation 
agreement.25 As it turned out, LSL developed such a seed, but 
Hazera did not,26 and thus, the agreement had no effect on 
competition between them or on U.S. commerce. Only if and when 
Hazera did develop a seed would the market-allocation 
agreement certainly restrain competition and have an effect on 
domestic commerce.27 The Ninth Circuit held that because 
Hazera had no seed and whether it would ever develop one of its 
own was “speculative at best,” the agreement had no direct effect 
on domestic commerce, suggesting that a plaintiff subjected to  
foreign conduct violating the antitrust laws but falling within 
FAITA could never challenge it before actual harm resulted. And 
interestingly, under this analysis, it would have done the 
Antitrust Division no good had the court chosen the “reasonably 
proximate causal nexus” standard rather than the “immediate 
consequence” standard because there was no domestic effect at 
all.28 Given its view, one wonders why the majority even went to 
                                                                                                     
 24. See United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 674 (9th Cir. 
2004) (summarizing the relationship between the parties and the basis for LSL’s 
claim).  
 25. Id. 
 26. See id. (“To date, Hazera has not developed a long shelf-life tomato 
seed.”).  
 27. See id. at 675 (explaining the “Restrictive Clause” of the LSL-Hazera 
agreement addendum and its ban on selling long shelf-life tomato seeds in 
North America).  
 28. In determining whether an agreement affects interstate commerce for 
purposes of § 1 of the Sherman Act, the Court examines the harm that would 
result if the conspiracy were successful rather than whether the conspiracy had 
any actual effect. See Summit Health v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 330–32 (1991) 
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the trouble of defining direct. Perhaps the court should have done 
what others had—dodge the issue.29  
That aside, the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in settling on the 
“immediate consequence” standard does not seem strong. The 
court appeared to view the issue as whether, in passing the 
FTAIA, Congress intended merely to codify the common law 
intent and effect requirements of Alcoa and its progeny or 
whether it intended to establish a new standard.30 As Ms. 
Leonard’s Note explains, common law on the issue would favor 
the “reasonably proximate causal nexus” meaning of direct over 
requiring that the domestic effect be the “immediate 
consequence” of the conduct. 
In holding that an effect is direct only if it follows as an 
immediate consequence of the defendant’s conduct, the Court 
appeared to rely primarily on two factors. First, it consulted a 
dictionary and found that one definition of direct is “‘proceeding 
from one point to another in time or space without deviation or 
interruption.’”31 The problem is that this is only one of several 
dictionary definitions of the word; others suggest that the 
consequence need not be immediate.32 For example, the 
dissenting judge pointed out that the very same dictionary from 
                                                                                                     
(determining that, as in all cases involving § 1 of the Sherman Act in which the 
per se rule applies, it is the agreement itself that is unlawful). The federal 
antitrust enforcement agencies would apply the same principle in foreign 
commerce situations. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FTC, ANTITRUST 
ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS § 3.121 Illustrative 
Example B (1995) (noting that circumstances triggering the application of the 
FTAIA requires agencies to “focus on the potential harm that would ensue if the 
conspiracy were successful, not on whether the actual conduct in furtherance of 
the conspiracy had in fact the prohibited effect upon interstate or foreign 
commerce”). 
 29. See LSL, 379 F.3d at 684 (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (“Although other 
appellate courts have dodged the critical issue . . . , this panel has decided to 
face the dragon in his teeth and stop tap dancing around the meaning of the 
word direct” (quotation omitted)). 
 30. See id. at 678 (“[M]any courts have debated whether the FTAIA 
established a new jurisdictional standard or merely codified the standard 
applied in Alcoa and its progeny.”). 
 31. Id. at 680 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 
640 (1982)). 
 32. See id. at 692 (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (noting that the same dictionary 
source utilized by the majority “contains seven main meanings in the adjective 
form, encompassing 31 more specific subsidiary meanings”). 
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which the majority drew its definition also defined direct as “‘a 
close especially logical, causal, or consequential relationship.’”33 
Thus, the majority’s choosing one dictionary meaning over 
others seems very weak support for its conclusion.34 
Second, the Court relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.,35 where the question 
was the meaning of direct as used in an entirely different 
statute, the FSIA.36 That statute provides, in part, that 
sovereign immunity from U.S. law does not apply to foreign 
states where their conduct causes a direct effect in the United 
States.37 But reliance on the meaning of direct in the FSIA 
seems questionable. All else equal, the circumstances under 
which a foreign government should be liable under U.S. law 
should be narrower than those under which private parties are. 
In sum, the majority opinion does not seem well-reasoned or 
supported. 
In the Seventh Circuit’s Minn-Chem decision, the 
plaintiffs, U.S. purchasers of potash from foreign producers, 
alleged that several foreign and U.S. producers had agreed on 
prices to charge in foreign countries and then used those as 
benchmarks for prices to charge in the United States.38 After 
first holding that the FTAIA’s substantiality and foreseeability 
requirements were clearly met,39 the court focused on the 
                                                                                                     
 33. Id. (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 640 
(1981)).  
 34. See id. (“It would be arbitrary simply to pick one definition and declare 
it the ‘plain meaning’ in the abstract.”). 
 35. 504 U.S. 607 (1992). 
 36. See id. at 618 (holding that Argentina’s bond payment rescheduling had 
a direct effect in the United States, where Argentina was to perform its ultimate 
contractual obligations, even though the bond holders were foreign 
corporations). 
 37. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2012) (codifying general exceptions to the 
jurisdictional immunity of a foreign state). 
 38. See Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 849 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(noting that “by 2008 potash prices had increased at least 600%” and that the 
“plaintiffs assert that this increase cannot be explained by a significant uptick 
in demand, changes in the cost of production, or other changes in input costs”). 
 39. See id. at 856 (determining that “the potash cartel described in the 
Complaint is one for which the requirements of substantiality and foreseeability 
are easily met” and that foreseeability is also straightforward because the 
international cartel controlled 71% of the world’s supply of a homogeneous 
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meaning of direct.40 It rejected the Ninth Circuit’s reliance on 
the Supreme Court’s definition of the term as used in the FSIA.41 
Noting that the FSIA includes no requirements of substantiality 
and foreseeability while the FTAIA does, it explained that the 
three requirements as used in the FTAIA should not be 
considered as separate, independent requirements.42 But because 
“Congress put them there, . . . it signaled that the word ‘direct’ 
used along with [substantiality and foreseeability] must be 
interpreted as part of an integrated phrase” because 
“[s]uperimposing the idea of ‘immediate consequence’ on top of 
the full phrase [including substantiality and foreseeability] 
results in a stricter test than the complete text of the statute can 
bear.”43 Direct imports might meet this “immediate consequence” 
requirement, but they were already explicitly excluded from 
coverage under the FTAIA. 
Second, the court explained that the direct-effect 
requirement merely reflected the classic concern that the effect 
not be too remote from its cause.44 Then, without much further 
explanation, the court concluded that the “reasonably proximate 
causal nexus” meaning of direct was more consistent with the 
language of the statute.45 
Neither LSL nor Minn-Chem seems to present convincing 
rationales for their results. But two factors lead me to agree with 
Ms. Leonard’s conclusion that the more encompassing 
“reasonably proximate causal nexus” meaning is the better choice 
than the more exclusionary “immediate consequence” meaning. 
                                                                                                     
commodity). 
 40. See id. (“The question that has caused more discussion among various 
courts and commentators is what it takes to show ‘direct’ effects.”). 
 41. See id. at 857 (finding that the Ninth Circuit incorrectly assumed that 
the FSIA and the FTAIA use the word direct in the same manner). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See id. (explaining that the practical effect of direct-effect requirement 
excludes from the Sherman Act “foreign activities that are too remote from the 
ultimate effects on U.S. domestic or import commerce”). 
 45. Id. More recently, the Second Circuit also rejected the “immediate 
consequence” meaning of direct for the same reasons as the Seventh Circuit in 
Minn-Chem. See Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 398 
(2d Cir. 2014) (rejecting the interpretation of “direct . . . effect” advanced by the 
Ninth Circuit). 
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First, if Congress had intended to adopt the “immediate 
consequence” meaning of direct, then it likely would not have 
included the foreseeability requirement because the two concepts 
are not separable; they must be read together because the 
concept of remoteness is part of both. Foreseeability, to me, 
connotes that an effect may not be the immediate consequence of 
the action but that the conduct and effect are sufficiently direct, 
or not so remote, that the defendants should have foreseen the 
effects that resulted. To me, that the effect must be foreseeable 
rules out the Ninth Circuit’s definition of direct as covering only 
an immediate consequence because foreseeability encompasses 
effects that are not immediate in the way the Ninth Circuit used 
that term.  
The second reason I agree with Ms. Leonard’s conclusion is 
the similarity between this issue and that of when a plaintiff is a 
proper party to recover for an antitrust violation—when a 
plaintiff has so-called “antitrust standing.”46 Just as Congress did 
not intend the FTAIA to permit suits for all foreign restraints on 
competition affecting domestic commerce however remote,47 it did 
not intend to permit every person injured by an antitrust 
violation, no matter how tangentially, to recover damages.48 
There must be limiting factors in both situations; in fact, the 
purpose of both the antitrust standing requirements and the 
FTAIA is to limit—in the former case, the plaintiffs who may 
                                                                                                     
 46. To recover damages for an antitrust violation, plaintiff must show that 
it has “antitrust standing” (specifically, that it is a proper party to bring the 
case). See generally Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State 
Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 539–46 (1983) (discussing the factors 
courts examine and balance when determining whether a plaintiff has antitrust 
standing). The antitrust standing requirement significantly limits the universe 
of parties injured by the violation who may recover damages. See, e.g., Del. 
Valley Surgical Supply, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 523 F.3d 1116, 1119–20 (9th 
Cir. 2008) (noting that the Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted provisions 
of antitrust statutes affording remedies, in this case § 4 of the Clayton Act, 
“thereby constraining the class of parties that have statutory standing to 
recover damages through antitrust suits”). 
 47. See Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 854 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(determining that Congress’s construction of the FTAIA indicates that they did 
not intend for the Sherman Act to apply to “every arrangement that literally can 
be said to involve trade or commerce with foreign nations”). 
 48. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 263 n.14 (1972) 
(“Congress did not intend the antitrust laws to provide a remedy in damages for 
all injuries that might conceivably be traced to an antitrust violation.”). 
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recover damages and in the latter case, in essence, who can 
recover for a violation in a foreign country.49  
The Supreme Court provided the appropriate factors to 
examine for determining antitrust standing in Associated General 
Contractors of California v. California State Council of 
Carpenters (AGC).50 Some of those factors and the direct and 
foreseeability requirements of the FTAIA are quite similar. The 
Court explained preliminarily that the common law provided 
limits on recovery in tort and contract cases by examining factors 
such as “foreseeability and proximate cause, [and] directness of 
injury,”51 and that although it did not debate these limitations 
when enacting Section 4(a) of the Clayton Act,52 the statute 
authorizing recovery of damages in antitrust cases, it must have 
assumed that antitrust plaintiffs “would be subject to constraints 
comparable to well-accepted common law rules applied in 
comparable litigation.”53 It would seem that Congress, aware of 
the common law on the extraterritorial application of the 
Sherman Act flowing from Alcoa and its progeny, would have had 
those principles in mind when enacting FTAIA. The “reasonably 
proximate causal nexus” meaning of direct embodies those 
principles to a much greater extent than the Ninth Circuit’s 
“immediate consequence” meaning. The Ninth Circuit suggested 
that Congress, in passing FTAIA, did not merely codify the 
common law but rather established a new “immediate 
consequence” standard.54 There is no reason to believe that, 
                                                                                                     
 49. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of 
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 534 (1983) (explaining that “Congress did not intend 
the antitrust laws to provide a remedy in damages for all injuries that might be 
traced to an antitrust violation”); see also supra notes 13–16 and accompanying 
text (describing Congress’s intent in passing the FTAIA). 
 50. See 459 U.S. 519 (1983) (determining that a labor union did not have 
standing to bring a lawsuit alleging that an association of employers conspired 
with third parties and members of the association to refuse to engage in 
collective bargaining). 
 51. Id. at 532. 
 52. The statute, read literally, would permit “any person” injured by an 
antitrust violation to recover damages. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012) (emphasis 
added). 
 53. Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 533. 
 54. See United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 683 (9th Cir. 
2004) (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (“The flash point of controversy, however, is 
whether the word ‘direct’ in the FTAIA is a new dimension added to traditional 
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however, particularly because the stated purpose of the statute 
was to “clarify” existing law,55 not replace it.  
In AGC, the Court explained that a plaintiff’s antitrust 
standing should depend on its “harm, the alleged wrongdoing by 
the defendants, and the relationship between them,”56 just as the 
applicability of the Sherman Act to foreign conduct should depend 
on the relationship between the violation and its relationship to 
domestic commerce. The Court then cited six factors that courts 
should examine in determining whether a plaintiff is an 
appropriate party to recover damages and thus to have antitrust 
standing.57 At least three seem directly relevant to the question 
of whether the Sherman Act should apply to unlawful conduct 
undertaken in foreign countries that affects U.S. commerce.58 
Each is more commensurate with the “reasonably proximate 
causal nexus” meaning of direct than with the “immediate 
consequence” meaning. 
The first is the degree of causal connection between the 
violation and the plaintiff’s injury—seemingly, whether the 
violation is the proximate cause because the Court had previously 
indicated that common law principles, including proximate cause 
of the injury, provide guidance.59 The second factor is whether the 
defendants intended to cause the plaintiff’s harm.60 This seems 
                                                                                                     
antitrust law that involves trade or commerce with foreign nations, as the 
majority concludes . . . .”). 
 55. See F. Hoffman–LaRoche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 169–70 
(2004) (noting that the language and history of the FTAIA suggest that 
Congress designed the act to clarify (or perhaps to limit), but not to expand in 
any significant way, the Sherman Act’s scope as applied to foreign commerce). 
 56. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of 
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 536 (1983) (noting that the question of whether the 
union may recover for the injury it allegedly suffered cannot be answered simply 
by reference to the broad language of § 4 of the Clayton Act). 
 57. See id. at 537–45 (listing factors relevant to whether a plaintiff is a 
person injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in 
antitrust laws, and therefore entitled to treble damages). 
 58. See infra notes 59–63 and accompanying text (analyzing each of the 
three factors which seem directly relevant to the Sherman Act’s international 
reach). 
 59. See Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 532–33, 537 (explaining 
that the common law required plaintiffs to prove, with certainty, both the 
existence of damages and the causal connection between the wrong and the 
injury). 
 60. Id.  
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akin to a foreseeability requirement. Intent and foreseeability are 
not synonymous but are closely related. Where a defendant 
intends to injure a plaintiff that injury is certainly foreseeable. 
The Minn-Chem court noted that an injury is foreseeable when 
the “effects . . . are a rationally expected outcome of the 
conduct.”61 If they are a rationally expected outcome, they would 
seem to be intended. If the effect on domestic commerce must be 
immediate for the Sherman Act to apply, one has to wonder why 
Congress included the foreseeability requirement, which connotes 
a less direct relationship between the conduct and its effect.  
The third factor is “the directness or indirectness of the 
asserted injury” or the “chain of causation between the 
[plaintiff’s] injury and the alleged restraints . . . .”62 Here, the 
Court appeared to be using the term direct to connote 
“remoteness” between the plaintiff and the alleged violation. In 
AGC, the plaintiffs’ injury was too remote for antitrust standing 
because others were more directly injured by the violation and 
thus would be more appropriate plaintiffs; the plaintiffs were 
“more remote part[ies]” than others.63  
AGC was decided after passage of the FTAIA, so one cannot 
argue that Congress simply drew the direct and foreseeable 
factors incorporated in the FTAIA from that decision. But these 
are common law concepts with which the FTAIA drafters were 
likely familiar and that seem to have application to both the 
question of when a plaintiff should have antitrust standing and 
the appropriateness of applying the Sherman Act to foreign 
conduct affecting domestic commerce. And they are familiar 
principles with which courts have substantial experience in 
applying. 
The issue Ms. Leonard discusses is a narrow and relatively 
esoteric one about which little has been written. Decisions are 
                                                                                                     
 61. See Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 856 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(analyzing whether the potash cartel described in the Complaint meets the 
requirements of “substantiality” and “foreseeability” under the FTAIA). 
 62. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of 
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 540 (1983). 
 63. See id. at 540–42 (determining that the injuries alleged by the Union 
were the indirect result of whatever harm may have been suffered by “certain” 
construction contractors and subcontractors); id. at 542 n.25 (appearing to tie 
directness of the injury and remoteness). 
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few and the rationales in those that do exist appear relatively 
weak. Thus, Ms. Leonard’s Note is a welcome addition in 
answering and explaining what should be, but is not, a simple 
question—the meaning of a seemingly simple word. Particularly 
given the scant authorities and guidance, Ms. Leonard’s Note 
handles the analysis well, and she reaches the right conclusion.  
